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Obama and the New Age of Reform
Aziz Rana
Barack Obama’s election as President, at a moment in which the U.S. finds itself mired
in multiple wars abroad and facing its worst economic crisis in decades, has been a joy-
ous occasion for Democrats – many of whom had grown unaccustomed to victory. It has
also produced a tremendous wave of popular excitement and optimism about the future of
American politics, a fact underscored by the staggering number of people who trekked out
to the Washington Mall for the Inauguration festivities. Such excitement is tied in part to
the belief that Obama the individual possesses a special set of qualities capable of solving
seemingly intractable problems, from finding peace in the Middle East to creating a workable
system of universal health care. And, in presenting himself as a modern day Lincoln or FDR,
Obama has stoked these expectations and fed into presumptions that he is no less than a
“once-in-a-lifetime leader,”1 committed to dramatic political and economic reform.
Yet, the question persists: what in fact is Obama’s vision of reform? When pressed by
conflicting agendas and constituents, which interests will he champion and whose goals will
be given greater weight? This essay is an initial effort at assessing Obama’s basic account
of politics, and its likely implications for policy efforts during his Administration. It begins
from an insight that initially may be counterintuitive. Rather than a new brand of politician,
Obama actually represents an historical throwback. In particular, his belief in the capacity of
competence and expertise to help people achieve social consensus and to transcend the petty
differences of ordinary politics touch upon essential elements of Progressive Era reformism.
And, like many Progressives from the early 20th century – such as Teddy Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson – Obama structured his campaign around a message deeply tied to the
ideal of professionalism and its distinctive vision of the American dream. His personal story
suggests the possibilities of success through meritocracy, educational achievement, and high
status employment. In today’s climate, it is a story especially compelling to upper status
voters, students, and African Americans, and has allowed him to create a powerful political
coalition. Each group sees Obama’s election as fulfilling the promise of the civil rights
movement and as proof of the continued vitality of equal opportunity.
Nonetheless, one wonders whether or not an Obama Administration can transcend the
limitations that plagued earlier Progressives. Such reformers were deeply wary of viewing
social problems as the product of fundamental differences between haves and have-nots
and therefore structural in nature. Instead, many argued that professional elites with the
right training and know-how could rule both efficiently and wisely. This progressive vision
failed to appreciate the extent to which American life remained subject to real political
disagreements – disagreements that could not be papered over by talk of consensus. It also
dramatically elevated the role of professionals in collective decision-making, and, in the
process, diminished non-professional and blue-collar accounts of respectability and middle
class achievement.
To the extent that Obama is a return to a previous reformist era, he may well carry both
the strengths and the drawbacks of the progressive approach to professionalism. For the
time being, the sheer optimism over the end of Republican rule has led competing elements
of the Democratic coalition to put aside their differences and to participate in a moment
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of national unity. In particular, hard times have pulled working class whites – the party’s
historic base – back into the Democratic fold. Such unity undoubtedly presents Obama with
a unique opportunity for systemic change, but what remains uncertain is his willingness
properly to seize the opportunity. This would require taking actual political risks, risks that
may well address the basic needs of core constituents, but would also lay bare persistent
social conflicts.
I. Obama as Messiah and Professional
At first glance, the idea that Barack Obama’s messianic, once-in-a-lifetime campaign captures
the aspirations and ideals of today’s professional middle classes may appear surprising to
say the least. We often associate professionalism with bureaucracy and bland competence,
a far cry from the politics of collective hope and charismatic leadership. The quintessential
salaried employee, civil servant, or lawyer follows the formal rules established by institutional
procedures. He or she possess technical expertise, and is defined by efficiency rather than
a commitment to higher ends or a willingness to question the objectives set by bosses and
social elites.
In his seminal book White Collar (1951), C. Wright Mills reached decidedly pessimistic
conclusions about the political agency and moral independence of these “new middle
classes.”2 Rather than shapers of history and social events, such individuals asserted no
will of their own and simply followed the tide of more powerful forces.3 According to Mills,
the junior law partner or middle manager “is always somebody’s man, the corporation’s,
the government’s, the army’s. . .[He is] the small creature who is acted upon but who does
not act, who works along unnoticed in somebody’s office or store, never talking loud, never
talking back, never taking a stand.”4 Subject to economic fragmentation and ideological
inertia, employees and professionals could not be expected to defend hard-won liberties or to
construct new social visions. Instead, the American white collar consisted of “rearguarders,”
who followed “the panicky ways of prestige” and “the ways of power, for, in the end, prestige
is determined by power.”5
Given this image of professionalism, in the recent presidential election Obama may not
have been the first candidate that jumped to mind as a spokesperson for the goals and
political instincts of the new middle classes. Mitt Romney referred to himself as a CEO
President and emphasized cutting government waste and making Washington more efficient.
Both Hillary Clinton and her husband graduated from Yale Law School, and Hillary was
a long-time corporate lawyer. Her campaign focused on experience, and she repeatedly
described herself as “ready on day one.” Her candidacy sought to elevate the importance of
competency and effective management and to deemphasize visionary politics. Yet, despite
speaking the language of bureaucratic efficiency, her support base largely included blue collar
workers, the less educated, and the elderly – precisely those groups we do not associate with
the urban elite. As a result, Clinton moved late in the primaries to refashion herself as a
champion of the working poor, proof that talk of competence has been less than successful
with supposedly efficiency-minded professionals. More importantly, it also underscored the
continuing inability of both labor and low-income constituencies to direct the agenda of the
Democratic Party. Blue collar votes may have been up for grabs, but the winners – third
way candidates like Clinton – hardly embodied the New Deal’s historic vision of social
democracy.
Ultimately, bureaucratic expertise only constitutes one element of the professional imagi-
nation. Alongside this account has always existed a deep reformist strain, one that sustained
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early 20th century Progressivism and which is witnessing a clear revival. A century ago,
Americans found themselves confronting a series of transformations, none more central than
the rise of a new industrial economy. This new economy produced deep social cleavages be-
tween corporate powers and increasing numbers of wage earners, which often devolved into
open conflict and massive labor strife. At the same time, it also helped to generate increas-
ing categories of salaried workers as well as the economic and social need for professional
groups like lawyers, doctors, social workers, and teachers. This process of professionaliza-
tion progressed rapidly in the late 19th century: the American Bar Association was formed
in 1878; the American Medical Association founded the Journal of the American Medical
Association in 1883; the first professional social work classes were offered in 1898. For
these new middle classes the labor question embodied a serious threat to the sustainability
of American institutions. Both workers and corporations were viewed as single-mindedly
devoted to their own partial interests, unable to conceive of the public good, and liable to
reduce collective life to conflict and disorder. Professionalism, on the other hand, offered a
way forward which could replace class antagonism with a politics of consensus and social
improvement. Indeed, this was the explicit idea behind the professionalization of social work,
as it sought to cast off any association with private charity and instead organize itself around
publicly minded universities and state-led public health programs.
II. Progressive Reform and the Professional Ethic
Louis Brandeis, in his 1905 Harvard lecture, “The Opportunity in the Law,” crystallized
the reformist impulse of the new middle classes. Brandeis argued that professionals such as
lawyers were specially situated to rise above discord and to think in terms of right policy
rather than divisive politics. This was due to two factors: the nature of both professional
education and professional work itself. He argued that the essence of legal training was “the
development of judgment,”6 in which lawyers learned the value of “patient research and
develop[ed] both the memory and the reasoning faculties.”7 Moreover, legal practice, like all
professional work, was marked by a high degree of everyday autonomy and creativity. The
lawyer defined his or her own tasks, ideally served a diverse and broad community, and over
time became skilled at testing moral and political logic against empirical reality.
According to Brandeis, the ideal professional was thus “an observer of men even more
than things. He not only sees men of all kinds, but knows their deepest secrets; sees them
in situations which ‘try men’s souls.’ He is apt to become a good judge of men.”8 Given
these attributes, Brandeis hoped that the professional stratum would struggle to reconcile
competing interests in defense of a broader non-partisan public good. This would necessarily
require protecting the weak against the powerful, but only in ways that reduced conflict and
allowed for the smooth functioning of collective institutions. Speaking to his fellow lawyers,
Brandeis concluded, “The people’s thought will take shape in action and it lies with us, with
you to whom in part the future belongs, to say on what lines the action is to be expressed;
whether it is to be expressed wisely and temperately, or wildly and intemperately; whether
it is to be expressed on lines of evolution or on lines of revolution.”9
For many early 20th century Progressives, professional leadership and social reform
went hand in hand. They imagined a government staffed by trained civil servants, who
would be armed with flexible mandates to pursue collective ends and would work with
community advocates such as social workers and teachers. At the heart of the vision of
professional leadership was a desire to escape politics – particularly the notion that differ-
ent constituencies had fundamentally divergent interests. Rather than social stratification
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being a structural feature of economic and political institutions, groups as distinct as
wage laborers and corporate elites could be made to find common ground. For this to
occur, middle class reformers believed more would be required than expert administra-
tion. The professional stratum had to produce individuals of unique capacity, whose back-
ground and skill could break the social impasse and compel competing forces to rise above
politics.
In his seminal book, The Search for Order (1969), historian Robert Wiebe calls this
professional view of extraordinary leadership the ideal of the “public man:”
Above them all stood the public man, a unique and indispensable leader. Although learned
enough to comprehend the details of a modern, specialized government, he was much more
than an expert among experts. His vision encompassed the entire nation, his impartiality
freed him from prejudices, and his detached wisdom enabled him to devise an equitable
and progressive policy for the whole society.10
The quintessential early 20th century example of the public man was Teddy Roosevelt. For
Roosevelt, government at its best was non-partisan; it was a site for reform carried out by
dedicated civil servants and overseen by a democratically elected leader. Such a leader –
whether a mayor, governor, or president – had to be armed with broad discretionary power
to coordinate social policy and to improve institutional rationality and efficiency. Yet, for
Roosevelt, perhaps the central role played by the public man was in educating ordinary
Americans in the greater good, and creating a cultural climate in which consensus and social
cooperation replaced bitter conflict. As Wiebe notes, “As the nation’s leader, the public man
would be an educator-extraordinary. He bore the greatest responsibility for raising mass
intelligence to the level of true public opinion.”11
Obama and his supporters often refer to the success of his campaign as heralding a new
movement. While such talk may be effective during a political election and in justifying new
policy initiatives, there are nonetheless important distinctions between Obama’s legions of
voters and the movements of the past century. Those movements were grounded in broad
social experiences of inequality and oppression. For women, industrial workers, tenant farm-
ers, or blacks, these experiences fostered group solidarity and led to grassroots campaigns of
protest and at times even outright rebellion. Obamamania is far more analogous to the vision
of Progressive reform led by a public man – a fact reinforced by the messianic language
associated with his presidential run. Like Teddy Roosevelt before him, Obama’s message
focuses on a desire to strip government decision-making of the messiness associated with
competing political interests and emphasizes his distinctive capacity to do so. In The Audac-
ity of Hope (2005), Obama concludes with a call for cooperation and an image of the U.S.
united around common public values. He writes:
The audacity of hope. That was the best of the American spirit, I thought – having the
audacity to believe despite all the evidence to the contrary that we could restore a sense of
community to a nation torn by conflict; the gall to believe that despite personal setbacks,
the loss of a job or an illness in the family or a childhood mired in poverty, we had some
control – and therefore responsibility – over our own fate.12
In substance, there is remarkably little to separate this call for unity from longstanding
reformist arguments. As with Brandeis, Obama’s language of consensus presupposes that
divergent interests are reconcilable, and that our problems are a matter of empty partisanship
rather than social structure.
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Yet, the heart of Obama’s appeal as a reformer is not simply the desire to overcome
conflict. The professional ethic also carries with it a commitment to the rule of law, efficient
administration, a healthy respect for scientific progress, and a belief that reason can be the
basis for social decision-making. Unifying all these commitments is a specific account of
the American dream. According to the professional ideal, the promise of American life rests
on a doctrine of equal opportunity. There must be no permanent hindrances to economic
improvement and social inclusion. All those who work hard should have the chance to
succeed and to enjoy the benefits of social mobility. For professional reformers from Jane
Addams at Hull-House to Barack Obama today, the essence of equal opportunity is higher
education in a meritocratic system – one which rewards individuals based on talent rather
than birth. If a person develops his or her skills through study, that person has the potential to
enjoy a career as a lawyer, doctor, or engineer. Such work brings with it social respectability,
an assured income, and extensive control over the substance and structure of one’s everyday
employment.
Obama’s life story embodies the possibility of this professional dream, and in doing so
expresses the political hopes of an entire social stratum. He suggests that with the right
leadership, government can make this vision of equal opportunity a lived reality. In his now
famous speech on race in March 2008, Obama described himself as proof of American
greatness: the potential for any individual, no matter what racial or class background, to
achieve the rewards of professional status. He also highlighted that it is precisely this back-
ground, his diverse connections and vast array of social experiences (from life in Indonesia
to Harvard Law School) that made him indispensably situated to protect the promise of equal
opportunity:
I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. I was raised
with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton’s Army
during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line at
Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. I’ve gone to some of the best schools in America
and lived in one of the world’s poorest nations. I am married to a black American who
carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners − an inheritance we pass on to our
two precious daughters. I have brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, uncles and cousins, of
every race and every hue, scattered across three continents, and for as long as I live, I will
never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible.13
In employing the language of hope and change to defend the professional account of social
mobility, Obama has created a formidable support base, buttressed by sky-high approval
ratings. He has done so in large part by tying the professional ethic to the aspirations
of the civil rights movement – and thus unifying two disconnected voting constituencies.
In terms of policy and rhetoric, Obama is most reminiscent of Bill Bradley’s Democratic
presidential run in 2000 – a run based on government reform and a rejection of Clinton-
era partisanship. Like Obama, Bradley also polled strongly with upper stratum voters and
professional demographics. Yet, unlike Obama, he was never able to gain an actual majority
in the primaries, because he could not appeal outside these social groups.
It would be simplistic to view Obama’s support within the black community as merely
a matter of ethnic solidarity; in fact, there has always been an element within the civil
rights movement that devoted itself expressly to opening the professional world to blacks
and other minorities. The best-known civil rights litigation of the 1950s involved segregated
primary schools, but the earliest NAACP test cases focused on postgraduate professional
study – especially law school. One of the first serious victories in the NAACP legal strategy
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was 1938’s Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, which held that Missouri violated equal
protection guarantees by failing to provide in-state law school education for black students.
A decade later, Sweatt v. Painter (1950) went further, holding that individuals could in no
way be denied access to law school on the basis of race. For NAACP lawyers, equality was
crucially about including blacks in the American project of social mobility – about winning
for blacks the opportunity to achieve professional status through meaningful education
and hard work. Obama’s personal story and political vision combine the hopes of both
the professional elite and many in the black community, carrying on the aspirations of
those early civil rights lawyers: that to aspire to become a lawyer would become a civil
right.
III. The Many American Dreams
While Obama’s campaign as today’s public man has brought him to the Presidency, his
continuity with the long tradition of Progressive reformism also carries with it a serious
potential limitation. This is because the American dream has never been a singular concept,
and throughout our history there have always been multiple versions of it. These accounts
held in common the hope that hard work, discipline, and self-reliance would allow Americans
not only to improve their economic lot and achieve personal happiness, but to participate
fully in political life. But, at present, only one version of the dream continues to make sense
as a sustainable personal project. This is the dream exemplified by Barack and Michelle
Obama – as well as by their former rivals Hillary and Bill Clinton – a dream of success
through higher education and a life in professional work.
In 1905, when Brandeis described the promise of professionalism, three earlier accounts
of the American dream not only survived but were real competitors for social preeminence.
In Thomas Jefferson’s founding republican vision, yeoman farmers were “the most valuable
citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are
tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interest by the most lasting bonds.”14 To
this Jeffersonian vision of “the cultivators of the earth,” a rapidly urbanizing 19th century
added the small-business owner and the unionized industrial worker. The former aspired to
the same freedom as the farmer by cultivating a shop instead of an acreage; the latter strove
(with mixed results) to achieve economic independence through collective political activity.
In Brandeis’s time, at least, pursuit of each of these three versions of the American dream
still constituted a viable promise of meaningful political and social life.
Today, by contrast, such dreams are all essentially foreclosed. Populations in rural towns
have collapsed, with the young moving elsewhere for jobs and opportunities. The rise of
agribusiness has consolidated agricultural production within a narrow range of corporate
firms, and transformed farming into a large-scale and ever-more concentrated economic
machine. The independent farmer lives on in the national imagination, but is increasingly
marginal both politically and socially. The quantity of small businesses begun each year sug-
gests that the aspiration of having one’s own shop persists. Yet the last half-century indicates
that bankruptcy is more likely than success. Statistics cited by George Bush’s own Small
Business Administration (SBA) show that more than half of small businesses close within
four years and more than 60 percent within six. The title of the SBA article, “Redefining
Business Success: Distinguishing between Failure and Closure,” perfectly captures the diffi-
culty of sustaining optimism, even for propaganda purposes, about the vitality of small-scale
entrepreneurship.15 As Mills prophetically wrote in 1951, “Small businesses become smaller,
big businesses become bigger.”16 With respect to blue-collar workers, deindustrialization and
C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Obama and the New Age of Reform: Aziz Rana 277
the weakening of the labor movement have made the wage earner’s dream of middle class
respectability more and more untenable. Real incomes for working class families have been
declining for three decades,17 and highly skilled jobs once available to high school graduates
are now remnants of a previous era.18
Abraham Lincoln, in his 1859 speech at the Wisconsin State Fair, concluded that the ideal
of the small businessman or farmer was meant to be accessible to everyone:
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for awhile, saves a surplus with which
to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and at
length hires another new beginner to help him. This, says its advocates, is free labor – the
just and generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way for all – gives hope to all,
and energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to all.19
This classless universality – the hope that every American, through free labor, could enjoy
middle class respectability, economic freedom, and the intellectual benefits of education –
lay at the core of the dreams championed by farmers, small-business owners, and factory
workers. In the 19th century, such universal rhetoric coexisted with the practical exclusion
of blacks and women, who were considered to be beneath formal citizenship. Crucially,
however, there was nothing intrinsic to farming, wage earning, or entrepreneurship that
required the permanent separation of these groups from the promise of social respectability.
Today, one can and should hope for an American dream that truly includes all Americans,
and which recognizes and respects all the different types of labor the country needs. This
would fulfill the promise of 19th century aspirations.
Instead we have been left with the professional ideal, which values only certain types of
work and thus implicitly disdains the rest. It is an inherently exclusive ideal, structured around
a divide between those engaged in high status work and those confined to task execution. The
political theorist Iris Marion Young writes, “Today equal opportunity has come to mean only
that no one is barred from entering competition for a relatively few privileged positions.”20
The idea of exclusivity is a necessary structural feature of professionalization. As a model
for society, however, it validates an economic and cultural divide between those with real
access to social respectability and the vast majority of Americans, who remain consigned to
low status and low-income employment.
As a result, the professional and educational meritocracy justifies a basic hierarchy in
which only those with professional status wield political and economic power. Individuals
at the top enjoy the privilege of deciding the fate of key institutions – what goals will
be accomplished, what goods produced, and how basic problems will be addressed. Most
people, by contrast, play little role in developing these plans and are often called upon only
to engage in routine activities or in work dismissed as “menial.” A central consequence is
that without collective participation and control, there is hardly any guarantee that decisions
will actually represent the interests and goals of individuals at the bottom rung of the social
ladder. Increasing numbers of immigrants, in particular, face the prospect of becoming
a permanent dependent community, disproportionately relegated to low skilled jobs with
limited mobility, living under the fear of potential deportation, and denied many of the basic
political and economic rights provided formal citizens. In essence, this meritocratic vision
of equal opportunity and economic success rejects the idea that every American – including
immigrants and regardless of social position – should gain the benefits of meaningful self-
rule. Precisely because all three alternative versions of the American dream were universal,
all imagined work – whether industrial, agricultural, or entrepreneurial – as a training ground
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for popular voice and political control. Farmers and entrepreneurs developed the personal
virtues necessary for practical decision-making. As for the industrial worker, the union was
considered a continuous education in the habits of civic participation, and one’s role in its
management and success were embodiments of democratic inclusion.
IV. The Long Civil Rights Movement
Barack Obama’s political ascent reiterates the current dominance of the professional ethic
and one side of the civil rights movement. But there was always another side, which pre-
sented the movement as our most recent attempt to create a political community in which all
individuals, including those truly marginalized, could assert power and achieve the Amer-
ican dream. Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. argued that our social problems were
structural, the result of fundamental differences between the haves and the have-nots. As
King maintained, real and lasting social consensus would require straightforwardly address-
ing these differences, because the interests of the culturally privileged rested on continuing
a politics of exclusion. At the end of King’s life, he repeatedly proclaimed that the civil
rights movement would only be complete if it became a poor people’s movement, one that
brought together blacks, working class whites, and immigrants – communities historically
pitted against each other. By this he meant that the ultimate goal of civil rights was the
elimination of basic inequalities, which consigned some to a life in poverty or systematically
denied them the opportunity to control either their work or their political community. He
was centrally concerned with how to restore social respectability to most Americans, an
experience increasingly the province of a dominant few. This required more than integrating
liberal society; it entailed taking apart the key economic and political hierarchies on which
postwar liberalism rested. Today’s professional creed – while undoubtedly better than the
Bush Administration’s culture of cronyism, corporate profiteering, and rejection of expertise
– remains a long way from these aspirations.
With the Republican Party reeling, Obama and the Democrats look to have a workable
political majority for the foreseeable future. Pressed by severe economic conditions, they
also have a clear opportunity to pursue a substantial reform agenda – covering issues of
housing, joblessness, and health care. Many are comparing the present moment to the New
Deal, in which an activist government greatly expanded the economic safety-net and created
a permanent Democratic majority for decades. Given these comparisons, it is critical to note
that the New Deal coalition was built on more than simply a social welfare agenda. While
Social Security, unemployment insurance, and Medicare have been essential to providing
millions of Americans with economic stability, the heart of the New Deal lay elsewhere.
From 1932 until 1968, the Democratic Party rested on two descriptions of American life –
the American dream as embodied by the rural farmer and the industrial worker. It gained
sustenance from a respect for these accounts of middle class achievement, economic inde-
pendence, and democratic inclusion. In other words, it offered a vision of solidarity and
social equality, which incorporated working class and poor citizens into a real experience of
membership.
For the new Administration to produce a similarly powerful political legacy, this means
combining far-reaching social initiatives – like universal health care – with forms of solidarity
and community that include, as equals, nonprofessionals and those at the cultural margins.
It necessitates going beyond Obama’s personal narrative of meritocratic success, one which
primarily offers a seemingly lose-lose proposition to most Americans: join the competition
for professional status and cultural privilege at a severe disadvantage, or do not join it at all.
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It also requires rejecting the rhetoric of superficial consensus, and coming to grips with
the basic divisions and internal tensions that mark American society. As Obama starts his
term in office, the sense of national expectancy presents his Administration with remark-
able possibilities – chief among them the chance to forge a durable social compact out of
diverse group interests. But in order to fulfill this promise, he will have to move beyond Pro-
gressive reformism and thus challenge the hegemony of the professional ideal. Especially
when the prevailing economic crisis abates, the question will be whether he and those around
him are committed to this task or to taking the political risks associated with it.
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